Uncertainties, Values, and Climate Targets

authored by

Mathias Frisch

Abstract

Using climate policy debates as a case study, I argue that a certain response to the argument from inductive risk, the hedging defense, runs afoul of a reasonable ethical principle: the no-passing-the-buck principle according to which scientists ought to offer their scientific judgment when such judgment is both possible and needed in public policy debates.

Organisation(s)

Institute of Philosophy

Type

Article

Journal

Philosophy of Science

Volume

87

Pages

979-990

No. of pages

12

ISSN

0031-8248

Publication date

12.2020

Publication status

Published

Peer reviewed

Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

History, Philosophy, History and Philosophy of Science

Sustainable Development Goals

SDG 13 - Climate Action

Electronic version(s)

https://doi.org/10.1086/710538 (Access: Closed)