Does an inconsistent land tenure certificate affect technical efficiency of smallholder rubber farming

Evidence from a panel data in Southwest China

authored by: Shi Min, Junfei Bai, Xiaobing Wang, Hermann Waibel
Abstract: The existing rural land tenure system in many developing countries is characterized by imperfections and conflicts. In rural regions of China, although most farmers possess land tenure certificates, there are instances where these certificates do not align with the actual land use. This study examines the technical efficiency (TE) of smallholder rubber farming at the plot level in Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture (XSBN) in Yunnan Province, China, using three-wave panel data. Additionally, the study aims to estimate the impact of inconsistent land tenure certificates on rubber plantations. The TE of smallholder rubber farming in XSBN ranged from 0.01 to 0.89, with an average of 0.554. The possession of a land tenure certificate indirectly enhances the TE of smallholder rubber farming by optimizing factor inputs. Furthermore, the TE of rubber plantations with forestland tenure certificates surpasses that of rubber plantations with farmland tenure certificates. This investigation sheds light on the issue of inconsistent land tenures in the context of economic forest expansion in southern China and advocates for further research in related areas. The findings contribute to the existing empirical evidence on the TE of smallholder rubber farming.
Organisation(s): Institute of Development and Agricultural Economics
External Organisation(s): Huazhong Agricultural University
China Agricultural University
Peking University
Type: Article
Journal: Forest policy and economics
Volume: 161
ISSN: 1389-9341
Publication date: 04.2024
Publication status: Published
Peer reviewed: Yes
ASJC Scopus subject areas: Forestry, Sociology and Political Science, Economics and Econometrics, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
Sustainable Development Goals: SDG 15 - Life on Land
Electronic version(s): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2024.103168 (Access: Closed)