Beyond the statutes

inequality in the access to boards of directors in eighteenth-century Portuguese joint-stock companies

Authored by

Angelica Vasconcelos

Abstract

This study analyses access to positions on the board of directors in early Portuguese joint-stock companies during the mid-eighteenth century, with a focus on the Pernambuco and Paraíba Company from 1759 to 1780. It challenges the conventional notion of objectivity in corporate governance, revealing discrepancies between the formal statutory criteria and actual practices. The research utilises archival documents to assess the eligibility of elected individuals and investigates exclusionary practices, particularly in relation to gender biases. Despite meeting formal eligibility requirements, female shareholders faced significant obstacles in securing leadership roles. Informal factors, such as familial networks and insider connections, played a substantial role in determining access to board positions, with the original élite group appointed by the Crown maintaining control. This highlights the illusion of objectivity in corporate governance. By positioning accounting records as narrative tools, the study underscores their role beyond mere financial transactions, documenting the underlying structures of social exclusion. This study sheds light on the complexities of inequality and power relations within historical business contexts, challenging existing narratives about eighteenth-century corporate governance and providing insights into similar dynamics in modern organisations.

Details

Organisation(s)
History Department
Type
Article
Journal
Accounting History Review
Volume
35
Pages
205-227
No. of pages
23
ISSN
2155-2851
Publication date
14.05.2025
Publication status
Published
Peer reviewed
Yes
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Accounting, Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous), General Business,Management and Accounting, History
Sustainable Development Goals
SDG 10 - Reduced Inequalities
Electronic version(s)
https://doi.org/10.1080/21552851.2025.2497255 (Access: Open )